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QJWIN

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The case officer in charge of ZRRIFLE also was involved in an operation to assassinate Fidel Castro, running from early 1962 to mid-1963. However, QJWIN was not used in this effort, reliance being placed instead on a Cuban exile leader. QJWIN was never briefed on the Castro operation, according to the officer handling ZRRIFLE and the Castro operation.


Records do show that QJWIN was dispatched to the Congo in 1960, being there in November and December 1960, prior to the

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death of Lumumba at the hands of Congolese. However, there is no evidence to suggest that QJWIN was in any way involved in Lumumba's demise. The case officer who was the source of the information of the contemplated use of QJWIN in such an activity understood that he was never used in this manner. The following information reviews existing knowledge beyond that summarized above.

A 13 October 1960 dispatch from Rome transmits notes to headquarters from one of the two officers who subsequently met QJWIN in Luxembourg. The notes list the names of police officials and criminal elements and allude to the possibilities of finding safecrackers and document-suppliers.

QJWIN was met in Luxembourg on 19 and 20 October 1960 by
two Agency officers and was asked if he would undertake a trip to
Africa, presumably Dakar. (The appropriate dispatch, dated
2 November 1960, lists only Luxembourg and Dakar as addressees.)
He was not given the true objective of his mission because of its
extreme sensitivity and pending a final decision to use him. Instead,
he was told that the Soviets were operating in Africa among nationality
groups, specifically Corsicans, and he was being asked to spot,
assess, and recommend some dependable, quick-witted persons for
our use. He agreed to go on the trip. On 2 November QJWIN was
met in Frankfurt by an Agency officer, and he accepted an offer to



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proceed to Leopoldville. (Presumably the idea for sending him there originated at headquarters because someone must have considered him qualified to handle a potential operation there.) The precise mission was not conveyed to QJWIN, and he was only informed that the mission might involve a large element of personal risk. We do not know and at present are unable to determine what the assignment was. Subsequent cable traffic discusses arrangements for QJWIN to go first to Leopoldville and then to Dakar.


On 8 December QJWIN was in Leopoldville where he cultivated a close personal relationship with a Yugoslav Air Force pilot. There follow suggestions in cable traffic on what approach QJWIN should use to recruit him. However, a special channel FI/D cable of 14 December rates this target as marginal when considered against the framework of plans for QJWIN and instructs him to desist if action has not already been taken. The first paragraph of this cable states that we "would like restrict QJWIN to activity directly pertinent his mission

Leopoldville or forthcoming mission Dakar and possibly elsewhere

(e.g., Milan) for FI/D purposes. He our only asset of this type and we wish keep him clean of any operational involvement other than that originally planned for him." This cable would tend to rule out involvement in an assassination plot, since it is highly unlikely that

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
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an individual picked for such a sensitive and dangerous assignment would be burdened with other chores or assignments immediately thereafter.

Lumumba was still alive, albeit under arrest, as of the middle of January 1961, and it seems clear that QJWIN had left the Congo in December 1960. A 19 December cable to Leopoldville authorizes his return to Luxembourg on 21 December and instructs Luxembourg to pay him 1000 dollars for December salary, which is the final payment for his services on this operation. Also, headquarters was working out the details of a Congo assignment. An 11 January 1961 headquarters memorandum, which refers to T/A's dated 21 December 1960, states that the referenced amounts were given to QJWIN by the Chief of Station, Luxembourg. This suggests that QJWIN was in Luxembourg on or before 21 December.

Subsequently, it appears that QJWIN operated in Europe trying to spot and assess individuals whom the Agency could use in safe-cracking operations, in line with one of the principal missions of FI/D. A 24 May 1962 cable to Luxembourg mentions that a decision was made to keep him in Europe and that the Leopoldville assignment had been cancelled. A transfer to Baden-Baden is deemed a good choice. Also, a 24 April 1964 disptach from Luxembourg, which





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mentions the termination of QJWIN's contract, refers to the fact that his only assignment since January 1962 has been to establish cover.

Agency officers who were handling QJWIN in Europe were almost certainly unaware of the fact that he was being considered as an asset by the senior Agency official who had begun to become active in February 1962 in the assassination plot against Castro. An undated (EYES ONLY) memorandum from the Deputy Director (Plans) refers to a 19 February 1962 memorandum and authorizes the retention of the services of QJWIN in activities which we have identified as coincidential with the assassination plot against Castro. The date of the reference memorandum coincides with the time that the senior Agency official became actively involved in this enterprise. A memorandum of 27 June 1963 dealing with the further handling of QJWIN mentions that this enterprise has been terminated, except for one precautionary "life line."

In summary, it is almost certain that QJWIN had nothing at all to do with the assassination of Lumumba, even though the contents and language of available files are often cryptic and imprecise. If he had been, it is highly unlikely that the number of Agency officers handling and contemplating assignments for him would have been so large. The





headquarters division for whom he worked was concerned, inter alia, with obtaining foreign cipher and code books, and it is reasonable to conclude that QJWIN's primary and exclusive responsibility was to find individuals who could do this kind of job. One of the officers who first met QJWIN in Luxembourg was on a trip overseas to find safecrackers and document-suppliers. The 14 December 1960 cable mentions keeping him clean and using him in Dakar and possibly Milan, which was specifically mentioned in the 13 October dispatch as offering good possibilities for finding safecrackers and document-suppliers. Further, good tradecraft practices would dictate that the last thing . that would keep an individual clean would be involvement in an assassination plot. Although the Chief of FI/D coincidentally was later assigned responsibility for the Castro operation, there is no evidence to suggest that he was privy to assassination plots prior to his briefing in late 1961.

While QJWIN was considered for use in the "executive action capability", there is no information available to suggest that he had ever been approached in this regard, much less used in any of the planning.

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Based on available evidence it seems clear that the Agency was in no way involved in the assassination of Lumumba. However, in the course of our research, two aspects of the Lumumba story surfaced that indicate Agency involvement in a plot. In the one instance, our 1967 source mentioned the name of an Agency officer who was designated as the case officer for an assassination plot against Lumumba, but reported that he had declined the assignment. That officer was the originator of a 19 December 1960 cable to Leopoldville in which he authorized the return of QJWIN to Luxembourg on 21 December to await further instructions and the payment of 1000 dollars to him for his December salary by the Luxembourg Station. The last paragraph of the cable advises Leopoldville that headquarters is working out the details of a Congo assignment for QJWIN. The same officer was the originator of a 31 January 1961 memorandum dealing with payments to QJWIN.

In the second instance, a 17 December 1960 cable from

Leopoldville deals with the activities of a newly recruited agent,

WIROGUE, whose mission was to try to spot persons for a

surveillance team, intelligence assets (with emphasis on Orientale

Province), and paramilitary assets. The second paragraph of the


cable mentions that he resided in the same hotel as QJWIN (although

neither knew of the others CIA connection) and that he approached

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the latter on 14 December with an offer of 300 dollars per month to participate in an intelligence net and to be a member of an "execution squad." When QJWIN said that he was not interested, WIROGUE added that there would be bonuses for special jobs. The cable mentioned in paragraph 6 that the Station was concerned with the free wheeling of WIROGUE, his lack of security, his inability to handle finances, and his unwillingness to follow instructions. The Station was willing to keep him on probation, but believed his recall would be the best solution. A suggested alternative was to put him in Stanleyville to try to obtain immediate intelligence on that area.

In an attempt to reconstruct events, Africa Division was apprised of the above and was asked to search its records in an attempt to clarify what WIROGUE was up to in the Congo and his reference to an "execution squad." The research did not clarify the matter to any great extent, although some assumptions can be made on the basis of circumstantial evidence. On 19 September 1960, two members of Africa Division met with WIROGUE to discuss an operational assignment in that division. In connection with the assignment, he was to be trained in demolitions, small arms, and medical immunization. In October 1960, a cable to Leopoldville stated that he was being prepared for a deep cover assignment to arrive Leopoldville late




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November. Headquarters noted the intent to use him as a utility agent in order to "(a) organize and conduct a surveillance team; (b) intercept packages; (c) blow up bridges; and (d) execute other assignments requiring positive action. His utilization is not to be restricted to Leopoldville. Indeed, he may be subject to call by other African stations although it is expected for him to be resident in Leopoldville."

WIROGUE arrived in Leopoldville on 2 December 1960. His case officer gave him the following instructions: (a) to build cover possibly by opening a photographic shop; and (b) to try to spot persons for a surveillance team, intelligence assets and paramilitary assets. Shortly after arrival, WIROGUE ran into QJWIN, who later told the station that WIROGUE looked like an intelligence agent. In attempting to recruit QJWIN for his "execution squad", WIROGUE exceeded his instructions to avoid making approaches without checking with Leopoldville Station.

In January 1961, at the request of the Leopoldville Station,
WIROGUE was given permission to take flying lessons. By March,
he had obtained the position of adviser to the Congolese Air Force
with the rank of major; in that capacity he was used by CIA for the
purpose of gathering intelligence on the Congolese Air Force. By
April, the Congolese were trying to use him to obtain arms and



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contract was terminated in September 1961.

Africa Division believes that WIROGUE was recruited for his

Congo assignment because of his third country national background
in order to establish a support mechanism in Leopoldville. At the
time the Congo was in chaos, we had few assets there, and the
likelihood existed that the political situation would degenerate
quickly. The Station possibly also wanted to have a latent paramilitary
capability. An October 1964 assessment of WIROGUE indicates little
flap potential with him since he knew little about the Agency. He spent
most of his time trying to develop contacts and was not directly involved
in any particular operation.

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FIGURE

QJWIN

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